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I   INTRODUCTION 
In July 2015, Indonesian authorities reportedly expressed concern over their 
apparent lack of legal tools to keep Islamists from spreading the extremist 
ideology of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (‘ISIS’) or from staging 
terror attacks in the country. 1  As a nation whose leadership, until the Bali 
bombings in October 2002, had long denied the existence of the terrorist group 
Jemaah Islamiyah (‘JI’) within its territory,2  Indonesia has continued to face 
ambivalence over constructing more robust national security legislation and its 
enforcement. Such ambivalence is a pattern common to most of Southeast Asia 
because of pre-existing internal strife that has been plaguing these countries for 
many decades. 3  ‘When [foreign extremists fighting for ISIS] return to their 
countries … it is not easy to predict what actions they might conduct’, as General 
Moeldoko, commanding general of the Indonesian military forces (Tentara 
Nasional Indonesia (‘TNI’)), told an audience in Singapore in October 2014.4 In 
the wake of the recent terrorist attacks in Jakarta on 14 January 2016, Indonesian 
authorities are reportedly planning to rectify the inadequacy of the current 
counter-terrorism legislation in the fight against ISIS on the domestic front.5 
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At best, the counter-terrorism legal instruments adopted hitherto by the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (‘ASEAN’) can be largely characterised 
as ‘soft law’, whose purpose has been to provide an overarching framework 
through which the respective and varied counter-terrorism policies of the 
ASEAN member states could be coordinated, as well as to secure region-wide 
endorsement. Central to this overarching framework is the ASEAN Convention on 
Counter-Terrorism (‘ACCT’).6 ASEAN’s relatively slow pace to adopt a regional 
treaty on counter-terrorism stands in marked contrast to other regions such as 
Africa, the Americas, Europe, South Asia, the Arab League, the Commonwealth 
of Independent States and Islamic countries, whose respective treaties were 
adopted prior to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. 7  Indeed, the ACCT achieved full 
ratification only in 2013 – six years after it was signed – although it came into 
force in 2011 after the sixth ASEAN member state had ratified it.  
In a region where the principle of non-interference governs the interstate 
relationship, the soft approach to regional co-operation on counter-terrorism 
comes as no surprise. Indeed, Andrew Chau observes that, while there is a 
rhetorical commitment to counter-terrorism among ASEAN leaders, ‘their 
declarations, meetings, and process of extensive consultation and consensus 
building have resulted in little that is concrete’.8 Other critics similarly argue that 
ASEAN counter-terrorism co-operation on the whole has been ill-conceived, 
half-hearted and weak.9 The problem is compounded by the perception that the 
sources of militancy and terrorism stem from neighbouring territories – hence 
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potentially complicating, if not compromising, ASEAN-based efforts,10 which are 
underpinned by the fundamental principles of respect for state sovereignty  
and non-interference.11 David Leheny considers this to be ‘emblematic of the 
problems that a seemingly uncontroversial goal – such as a world without 
terrorism – has when it confronts other domestic and regional priorities for Asia-
Pacific governments’.12 
However, the challenges that have been confronting ASEAN are due to the 
ambivalence on the part of its member states towards rigorous counter-terrorism 
measures because of domestic political reasons, as much as the legal and political 
constraints upon ASEAN. National counter-terrorism efforts in each country are 
enmeshed with their own political agenda of national harmony and combating 
dissidents. 13  As a consequence, there is necessarily a challenge to regional 
initiatives absent harmonisation of national counter-terrorism measures. The 
relevant question is, therefore, to what extent ASEAN has contributed to the 
development and implementation of counter-terrorism law and policy through the 
exercise of its institutional competence to address a shared security interest, not 
whether ASEAN is effective in harmonising national responses to counter-
terrorism in the region. 
To that end, this article examines ASEAN’s counter-terrorism efforts as a 
case study of ASEAN’s institutional evolution with a view to assessing how 
ASEAN has facilitated the development of legal and policy responses to 
terrorism in each member state in accordance with its foundational principles. 
Part II reviews ASEAN’s regional initiatives on counter-terrorism with reference 
to key legal instruments that form part of broader regional co-operation to 
combat transnational organised crimes in Southeast Asia. Part III focuses on the 
domestic implementation of those regional instruments with a close examination 
of how counter-terrorism law has been enacted in each member state. Part IV 
then considers what the gap between counter-terrorism initiatives at the regional 
and national levels means for: (1) the development of ASEAN’s institutional 
competence; and (2) the working method of ASEAN – based on the diplomatic 
convention characterised by consensus-building, consultation and informality, 
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known as the ‘ASEAN Way’14 – in exercising its legal authority to deal with a 
regional security issue. This article concludes with the finding that through 
regional counter-terrorism initiatives, ASEAN has exercised its institutional 
competence in a way that complements respective national efforts of its member 
states in building their legal and operational capacity to engage in international 
co-operation for counter-terrorism. 
 
II   ASEAN COUNTER-TERRORISM INITIATIVES 
ASEAN as a whole has evolved in its response towards terrorism. Before 
9/11, ‘transnational crime’ was the broad category or rubric under which 
declarations on and regional responses to terrorism were included. This approach 
highlighted the traditional perspective on terrorism as criminal act and internal 
subversion whose management was to be best left in the hands of law 
enforcement agencies. At the operational level, it was acknowledged that there 
were significant overlaps between terrorism and other areas of transnational 
criminal activity such as money laundering, the trafficking of drugs and people, 
and/or piracy.15 This understanding reflected the relevance to the Southeast Asian 
region of the principle of ‘comprehensive security’ espoused by ASEAN.16 
Crucially, the foregoing approach did not necessarily imply that ASEAN 
governments viewed terrorism as insignificant relative to other security 
problems. Rather, their shared reluctance to fully securitise transnational crime 
and non-military issues more broadly ensured that the counter-terrorism policies 
within ASEAN member states by and large precluded the use of armed force as 
the exclusive means to combat terrorism. The then Philippine President Fidel 
Ramos urged ASEAN Interior and Home Affairs Ministers gathered at the First 
Conference to Address Transnational Crimes held in Manila on 20 December 
1997 as follows: 
The concept of regional security should extend beyond the mere absence of armed 
conflict among and within nations. Enduring regional security continues to be 
assaulted by transnational crime and from time to time international terrorism, 
which threaten the attainment of our peoples’ goals and aspirations. We cannot 
allow these criminals and terrorists to steal our future and that of our young people 
away from us.17 
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It was against this background that the ASEAN Declaration on Transnational 
Crime (‘1997 Declaration on Transnational Crime’) was signed in Manila on 20 
December 1997. While the 1997 Declaration on Transnational Crime arguably 
underscored the collective commitment of ASEAN member states to co-operate 
in their efforts against transnational criminal activity, it nonetheless adhered to 
the ‘ASEAN Way’ of decision-making by consensus and the reliance on non-
binding rules.  
The treatment of terrorism as a subset of transnational crime – or, from a 
conceptual perspective, a criminal justice approach rather than military  
response to terrorism – at the regional level persisted until the end of the 1990s 
with the adoption of two addenda to the 1997 Declaration on Transnational 
Crime: namely, the Manila Declaration on the Prevention and Control of 
Transnational Crime;18 and the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational 
Crime.19 However, despite their collective acknowledgement of terrorism as a 
transnational phenomenon and problem, little concrete progress was made until 
the game-changing impact of the 9/11 events brought terrorism to the forefront of 
national and regional security agendas. The ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action 
to Counter Terrorism (‘ADJACT’) was adopted in 2001,20 two weeks after the 
release of the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (‘APEC’) Leaders’ Statement 
on Counter-Terrorism at their Shanghai Summit.21 In the view of Tatik Hafidz, 
who once coordinated ASEAN co-operation on combating transnational crime 
including terrorism at the ASEAN Secretariat, three points in the ADJACT’s 
preamble are especially noteworthy, not least for their purported riposte to the 
United States-led global ‘War on Terror’. According to Hafidz: 
Whilst it may sound normative to ASEAN outsiders, the declaration’s preamble 
signifies a Southeast Asian united front on the issue of terrorism. The first point is 
indeed a universal principle, but it also underscores concerns over what some 
Southeast Asian Muslims perceived to be a camouflaged war on Islam. The 
second recognises that despite the fact that global war on terrorism is an 
American-led agenda, it is also a regional issue as it has significant ramifications 
for ASEAN. But the third clearly signifies a denunciation of the Bush 
Administration’s unilateralism and its widely-criticised doctrine of pre-emptive 
strike. In this regard, ASEAN asserts that the fight against terrorism must be 
guided by [the] multilateralism principle as set forth in the United Nations (UN) 
Charter. This explains the centrality of the UN multilateral framework on counter-
terrorism – known as the universal anti-terrorism instruments (UATIs) – as 
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primary reference for intra as well as extra-regional cooperation on counter 
terrorism.22 
On that basis, ASEAN member states adopted practical measures including, 
most relevantly, reviewing and strengthening their national mechanisms to 
combat terrorism, studying relevant international conventions on terrorism with a 
view to integrating them with ASEAN mechanisms, enhancing intelligence 
sharing on terrorists and terrorist organisations, and developing regional 
capacity-building programmes.23 The Joint Communique of the Third ASEAN 
Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime, issued on 11 October 2001, detailed 
efforts to eradicate regional security challenges such as terrorism.24 This was 
followed by a ‘special’ ASEAN ministerial meeting dedicated specifically to 
terrorism on 17 May 2002, which adopted a Work Programme to Implement the 
ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime (‘Work Programme’) 
(originally signed in June 1999).25 The Work Programme detailed a six-pronged 
strategy including the establishment of legal facilities and institutional capacities 
within the ASEAN member states.26  
Following the Bali bombing in October 2002, a standalone declaration on 
terrorism was adopted at the ASEAN Summit in Phnom Penh on 3 November 
2002, a week after the APEC Leaders issued the Statement on Fighting 
Terrorism and Promoting Growth.27 The ASEAN Declaration on Terrorism urged 
member states  
to continue to intensify their cooperation in combating terrorism and, in particular, 
in expeditiously carrying out the [Work Programme] adopted by the Special 
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Terrorism in Kuala Lumpur in May 2002, raising 
the level of cooperation, coordination and the sharing of information in the fight 
against terrorism.28  
APEC, on the other hand, has developed Counter-Terrorism Action Plans 
providing a space where member economies can record their APEC 
commitments to various counter-terrorism measures – such as securing cargoes, 
protecting people in transit, international shipping and aviation, and promoting 
cyber security. 
ASEAN has since then signed a number of joint declarations with its external 
dialogue partners – the United States (‘US’), the European Union (‘EU’), 
                                                 
22  Tatik S Hafidz, ‘A Long Row to Hoe: A Critical Assessment of ASEAN Cooperation on Counter-
Terrorism’ [2009] (11) Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia <http://kyotoreview.org/issue-11/a-long-row-to-
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communique-of-the-third-asean-ministerial-meeting-on-transnational-crime-ammtc-singapore-11-
october-2001>. 
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28  Declaration on Terrorism by the 8th ASEAN Summit, adopted 3 November 2002, para 4 
<http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/asean/pmv0211/terro.html>. 
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Australia, India, Russia, Japan, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Pakistan 
and Canada – before, interestingly so, it adopted its own counter-terrorism 
treaty.29 While ASEAN has no joint declaration with the People’s Republic of 
China on counter-terrorism as such, it forms part of a priority issue in the Joint 
Declaration of ASEAN and China on Cooperation in the Field of Non-
Traditional Security Issues.30 
ASEAN member states have also sought to enhance counter-terrorism co-
operation with one another. In May 2002, Indonesia, Malaysia and the 
Philippines (joined later by Cambodia and Thailand) signed a counter-terrorism 
agreement to strengthen border controls, share airline passenger information, 
establish hotlines, share intelligence and adopt standard procedures for search 
and rescue.31 Several other nations in the region also signed similar cooperative 
agreements, and co-operation between governments – in particular law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies – increased in 2002 and 2003.32  Such 
intramural collaboration, particularly with the assistance of external partners such 
as Australia and the US, has led to some successes despite many difficulties and 
sensitivities involved due to the political and economic constraints in Southeast 
Asian nations.33  
Another ASEAN agreement relevant to its counter-terrorism efforts is the 
Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, adopted on 29 
November 2004 and also referred to as the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty 
(‘MLAT’). The aim of the MLAT is to enhance the effectiveness of the law 
                                                 
29  The text of these joint declarations is reproduced in Political-Security Department Security Cooperation 
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?static_post=asean-documents-on-combating-transnational-crime-and-terrorism> (‘ASEAN Documents on 
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Ramakrishna, ‘ASEAN–US Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism: A More Nuanced Approach 
Needed’ (Commentary No 10/2002, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies, 29 August 2002) 
<https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/CO02010.pdf>; Felix Heiduk, ‘In It Together Yet 
Worlds Apart? EU–ASEAN Counter-Terrorism Cooperation after the Bali Bombings’ (2014) 36 Journal 
of European Integration 697; Ted Osius and C Raja Mohan, ‘Enhancing India–ASEAN Connectivity’ 
(Report, Centre for Strategic & International Studies, June 2013); Sarah Teo, Bhubhindar Singh and See 
Seng Tan, ‘Southeast Asian Perspectives on South Korea’s Middle Power Engagement Initiatives’ (2016) 
56 Asian Survey 555.  
30  Adopted 4 November 2002 <http://asean.org/?static_post=joint-declaration-of-asean-and-china-on-
cooperation-in-the-field-of-non-traditional-security-issues-6th-asean-china-summit-phnom-penh-4-
november-2002-2>. 
31  S Pushpanathan, ASEAN Efforts to Combat Terrorism (20 August 2003) ASEAN <http://asean.org/ 
?static_post=asean-efforts-to-combat-terrorism-by-spushpanathan>. 
32  See David Capie, ‘Trading the Tools of Terror: Armed Groups and Light Weapons Proliferation in 
Southeast Asia’ in Paul J Smith (ed), Terrorism and Violence in Southeast Asia: Transnational 
Challenges to States and Regional Stability: Transnational Challenges to States and Regional Stability 
(Routledge, 2015) 188, 209 n 98. 
33  See Seng Tan and Kumar Ramakrishna, ‘Interstate and Intrastate Dynamics in Southeast Asia’s War on 
Terror’ (2004) 24 SAIS Review of International Affairs 91; Simon Tay and Tan Hsien Li, ‘Southeast 
Asian Cooperation on Anti-Terrorism: The Dynamics and Limits of Regional Responses’ in Victor V 
Ramraj, Michael Hor and Kent Roach (eds), Global Anti-Terrorism Law and Policy (Cambridge 
University Press, 2005) 399. 
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enforcement agencies of ASEAN member states in the investigation and 
prosecution of offences through co-operation and mutual legal assistance in 
criminal matters. In 2015, the MLAT came into the spotlight when Indonesian 
authorities decided to execute eight convicted drug smugglers, which led 
Australia to recall its Ambassador to Indonesia in protest over the executions of 
two Australians. By contrast, an eleventh-hour reprieve was given to a Filipina, 
Mary Jane Veloso, which ostensibly came as a consequence of Manila’s appeal 
to Jakarta by way of the MLAT.34 
All these efforts helped lay the groundwork for the adoption of the ACCT in 
2007. The late arrival of the ACCT in contrast to the earlier adoption of counter-
terrorism treaties in other regions has already been mentioned. 35  The ACCT 
simply refers to all the relevant counter-terrorism treaties to define ‘offence’ for 
the purpose of the ACCT, while allowing variation for those member states that 
are not party to some of those treaties.36 The primary obligation imposed upon the 
member states under the ACCT is summarised in the General Provisions under 
article IX(1), which provides: 
The Parties shall adopt such measures as may be necessary, including, where 
appropriate, national legislation, to ensure that offences covered in Article II of 
this Convention, especially when it is intended to intimidate a population, or to 
compel a government or an international organisation to do or to abstain from 
doing any act, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of a 
political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other similar 
nature. 
The legal significance of this provision is twofold. First, it introduces an 
element of intent as commonly found in the definition of terrorism adopted in 
many countries,37 though whether states are required to include it in domestic 
counter-terrorism legislation is subject to interpretation. Second, it establishes a 
shared understanding to exclude the nature of the motive behind the act, such as a 
political, religious or ideological motivation on the part of terrorists from 
criminalisation of terrorism within the region.38 The latter aspect is particularly 
important given the political, religious, racial, ethnic, and ideological diversity 
that exists in Southeast Asia where criminal investigations and trials can easily be 
politicised on those grounds.  
Other provisions of the ACCT are largely facilitative in nature, rather than 
prescriptive of new obligations – reaffirming obligations under the relevant 
                                                 
34  Mark Merueñas, ‘De Lima: ASEAN Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty Saved Veloso’, GMA News (online), 
29 April 2015 <http://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/478474/news/nation/de-lima-asean-mutual-
legal-assistance-treaty-saved-veloso>. 
35  See above n 7 and accompanying text. 
36  ACCT art II. 
37  See, eg, Christian Walter, ‘Defining Terrorism in National and International Law’ in Christian Walter et 
al (eds), Terrorism as a Challenge for National and International Law: Security versus Liberty? 
(Springer, 2004) 23, 28–30. 
38  For controversies on the inclusion of motives in the definition of terrorism, see especially Ben Saul, ‘The 
Curious Element of Motive in Definitions of Terrorism: Essential Ingredient or Criminalising Thought?’ 
in Andrew Lynch, Edwina MacDonald and George Williams (eds), Law and Liberty in the War on Terror 
(Federation Press, 2007) 28; Ben Saul, Defining Terrorism in International Law (Oxford University 
Press, 2006) 40–5. 
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counter-terrorism treaties for national implementation,39 and identifying areas of 
co-operation ‘in conformity with their respective domestic laws’.40 Nevertheless, 
as a legally binding instrument,41 the ACCT has been described as ‘a significant 
milestone in ASEAN counter-terrorism co-operation with much potential in the 
areas of information-sharing and capacity-building’.42 In a statement released a 
few days after the 10th and final ratification by Malaysia on 11 January 2013, the 
ASEAN Secretariat noted that ‘[t]he ACCT is a significant achievement of 
ASEAN’s counter-terrorism efforts as it serves as [a] framework for regional 
cooperation to counter, prevent, and suppress terrorism and deepen counter-
terrorism cooperation’.43 
The adoption of this Convention was soon followed by the development of 
the 2009 ASEAN Comprehensive Plan of Action on Counter Terrorism.44 Meant 
as the ‘meat’ to the ACCT ‘skeleton’, the comprehensive action plan furnished 
the following embellishment: ‘to counter, prevent and suppress terrorism, 
terrorist organisations and their associations, to disrupt their support networks 
and impede their plan of terror acts, and to bring them to justice’.45 This was to be 
accomplished through, among others:  
 adherence to relevant United Nations (‘UN’) Security Council 
resolutions and international counter-terrorism instruments;  
 the implementation of the relevant existing regional legal frameworks, 
instruments and agreements;  
 the establishment of institutionalised mechanisms for the exchange of 
information and intelligence for surveillance, tracking and interdiction of 
suspected terrorist groups and their activities; and 
 the efforts to address the root causes of terrorism through various societal 
changes.46 
Regional counter-terrorism co-operation through ASEAN can thus be 
characterised, at the fundamental level, as multilateral initiatives that 
complement respective national efforts, which are based on the traditional 
strategies and structures that remain as the legacies of their fight against 
communist insurgency and dissidence. These regional initiatives have attempted 
                                                 
39  ACCT arts VII, X, XIII–XIV. 
40  ACCT arts VI, XII.  
41  Ong Keng Yong, ‘ASEAN’s Contribution to Regional Efforts in Counter-Terrorism’ (Speech delivered at 
the National Security Australia Conference, Sydney, 21 February 2005) <http://asean.org/?static_post= 
asean-s-contribution-to-regional-efforts-in-counter-terrorism>. 
42  It is so acknowledged by the Singaporean Senior Minister of State for Home Affairs and Foreign Affairs: 
Masagos Zulkifli, ‘2nd ASEAN Counter-Terrorism Workshop on Joint Incident Management at Orchard 
Hotel’ (Speech delivered at the 2nd ASEAN Counter-Terrorism Workshop on Joint Incident Management, 
Singapore, 16 July 2014) <https://www.mha.gov.sg/Newsroom/speeches/Pages/2nd-ASEAN-
CounterTerrorism-Workshop-on-Joint-Incident-Management-at-Orchard-Hotel--Speech-by-Senior-
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43  Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Convention Completes Ratification Process, above n 6. 
44  Adopted 30 June 2009, reproduced in ASEAN Documents on Combating Transnational Crime and 
Terrorism, above n 29, 69–75. 
45  Ibid 69 [1.1]. 
46  Ibid 69–73 [3]–[5], [10]. 
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to overcome the limits of national efforts against transnational threats posed by 
modern terrorist activities.47 
 
III   COUNTER-TERRORISM LAW AND POLICY IN ASEAN 
MEMBER STATES 
ASEAN member states have sought to deal with terrorism through varying 
combinations of approaches: military measures; socio-economic, ideological, and 
educational policies; as well as the enactment and enforcement of counter-
terrorism laws. They have also sought to enhance counter-terrorism co-operation 
among themselves and with external partners such as Australia and the US.48  
Despite the regional initiatives as examined above to enhance counter-
terrorism co-operation, Southeast Asian governments have not handled terrorism 
in the same way. For example, Indonesia and Singapore have tended to adopt a 
non-militaristic, law enforcement approach to tackling the challenge, whereas 
Malaysia and Thailand have relied on more coercive, militaristic responses. 
History clearly plays a role in the strategic choice of these countries. The 
experiences Malaysia has had in dealing with armed communist rebellions and 
the manner in which Thailand has responded to the separatist insurgency in its 
southern Malay-Muslim provinces have likely shaped their preferences for a 
militarised approach to their respective terrorism challenges.49 On the other hand, 
with the end of the military’s prominent role in Indonesian politics after 1998, 
internal threats of terrorism, communal violence and separatist activities became 
the primary responsibility of the Indonesian National Police. Having been 
dissatisfied with the ineffective response of the Indonesian National Police to 
terrorist attacks, the Indonesian military launched a new counter-terrorism squad 
called the TNI Joint Special Operations Command (Koopsusgab) in June 2015, 
which immediately reignited concerns about the military’s role in the country’s 
domestic affairs.50  
Critical for the purpose of this article, however, are the differences in  
legal approaches to counter-terrorism in terms of the ratification and 
implementation of relevant rules of international law – particularly the 1997 
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (‘Terrorist 
Bombing Convention’), 51  1999 International Convention for the Suppression  
                                                 
47  See Acharya, Targeting Terrorist Financing, above n 15, 216–19. 
48  See the table of bilateral agreements and memorandums of understanding in Amitav Acharya, 
Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem of Regional Order 
(Routledge, 2nd ed, 2009) 247. 
49  See, eg, Donald Mackay, The Malayan Emergency 1948–60: The Domino That Stood (Brassey’s, 1997); 
Zachary Abuza, Conspiracy of Silence: The Insurgency in Southern Thailand (United States Institute of 
Peace, 2009). 
50  Prashanth Parameswaran, The Trouble with Indonesia’s New Counterterrorism Command (11 June 2015) 
The Diplomat <http://thediplomat.com/2015/06/the-trouble-with-indonesias-new-counterterrorism-
command/>. 
51  Opened for signature 15 December 1997, 2149 UNTS 256 (entered into force 23 May 2001). 
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of the Financing of Terrorism (‘Terrorist Financing Convention’), 52  relevant  
UN Security Council resolutions,53 as well as the 2007 ACCT – through the 
enactment of relevant legislation.  
For Indonesia, the bomb attacks in Bali in 2002 and in Jakarta in 2003 
furnished ample reasons to establish a legislative and law enforcement scheme 
conducive to fighting terrorism, despite the fact that Jakarta had denied JI’s 
existence within its territory until then.54 Nevertheless, Indonesia’s legislative 
response to terrorism has been slow due to, among other factors, public resistance 
to the introduction of a new anti-terrorism law. There is fear among the public of 
the use of draconian laws to suppress dissidents as was the case under the 
Suharto regime.55 Since 2003, Indonesia has been advocating for an ASEAN-
wide extradition treaty ‘that would help speed up the investigation process 
especially with terrorism’, according to an official from the Indonesian foreign 
ministry.56 For the Indonesians, the problem standing in the way of establishing a 
region-wide extradition agreement is Singapore, which has sought to link its 
bilateral extradition treaty with Indonesia to a defence agreement the two 
countries had signed in 2007.57 However, Indonesia has yet to ratify this defence 
agreement because of the perception – fair or otherwise – that Singapore is 
seeking to avoid the forced repatriation of Indonesians suspected of corruption 
who had allegedly fled to Singapore.58 Indonesia ratified the ACCT on 20 March 
2012 with the expectation that it would provide a foundation for mutual legal 
assistance and extradition in combating terrorism.59 
Upon acceding to the Terrorist Bombing Convention in 2003, Malaysia 
amended its penal code to insert offences relating to terrorism defining a terrorist 
act in a manner that closely mirrors the UK definition.60 In July 2003, Malaysia 
                                                 
52  Opened for signature 9 December 1999, 2178 UNTS 197 (entered into force 10 April 2002). 
53  For example, SC Res 1373, UN SCOR, 56th sess, 4385th mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1373 (28 September 2001) 
(‘Resolution 1373’); SC Res 1624, UN SCOR, 60th sess, 5261st mtg, UN Doc S/RES/1624 (14 September 
2005) (‘Resolution 1624’). 
54  The Indonesian government, ‘which had continued to deny that there was a terrorist network in Indonesia, 
now had to openly admit its existence’: Leo Suryadinata, ‘Indonesia: Continuing Challenges and Fragile 
Stability’ in Daljit Singh and Chin Kin Wah (eds), Southeast Asian Affairs 2004 (Institute of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 2004) 89, 89. 
55  See Kent Roach, The 9/11 Effect: Comparative Counter-Terrorism (Cambridge University Press, 2011) 
145–53. 
56  Gary Jusuf, quoted in ‘Indonesia Pushes ASEAN Extradition Agreement’, Manila Standard (Manila), 23 
January 2003, 5A. 
57  Ministry of Defence (Singapore), ‘Defence Cooperation Agreement’ (Official Release, 27 April 2007) 
<http://www.mindef.gov.sg/imindef/press_room/official_releases/nr/2007/apr/27apr07_nr.html#.V3tbQf
N-9aQ>. 
58  Saifulbahri Ismail, ‘Indonesia VP's Comments on Extradition “Misleading”: Singapore’, Channel News 
Asia (online), 23 April 2016, <http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/indonesia-vp-s-
comments/2723920.html>. 
59  Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Indonesia),‘The House of Representatives and Government of Indonesia 
Reached a Mutual Agreement on the Ratification of ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism’ (Media 
Release, 8 March 2012) <http://www.kemlu.go.id/en/berita/Pages/The-House-of-Representatives-and-
Government-of-Indonesia-Reached-a-Mutual-Agreement-on-the-Ratificat.aspx>. 
60  Penal Code 1936 (Malaysia) s 130B, as inserted by Penal Code (Amendment) Act 2003 (Malaysia). See 
also Kent Roach, ‘Comparative Counter-Terrorism Law Comes of Age’ in Kent Roach (ed), Comparative 
Counter-Terrorism Law (Cambridge University Press, 2015) 1, 25. 
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established a Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counterterrorism tasked with 
regional training, information sharing and public awareness campaigns. Even 
though Malaysia repealed its Internal Security Act 1960 (Malaysia) (‘Internal 
Security Act’) in 2012 as part of the political campaign led by Prime Minister 
Datuk Seri Najib Tun Razak, the executive power to detain for an extended 
period without a court order remained in matters concerning terrorism, with the 
enactment of the Security Offences (Special Measures) Act 2012 (Malaysia) 
which was modelled upon counter-terrorism legislation in various Western 
countries.61 
In 2013, Malaysia re-arrested Yazid Sufaat, a former Malaysian army 
captain, who had been detained without trial for more than seven years under the 
Internal Security Act until his release in 2008 and was the first to be charged 
under the 2012 Act.62 Kumar Ramakrishna observes that ‘[t]he fact that [Yazid] 
has to be re-arrested shows the learning process that the Malaysian police and 
courts have to go through under the new legal regime’.63 Malaysia continued its 
law reform efforts with the re-introduction of preventative detention through the 
2013 amendments to the Prevention of Crime Act 1959 (Malaysia) and the 
enactment of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2015 (Malaysia), as well as the 
Special Measures against Terrorism in Foreign Countries Act 2015 (Malaysia) to 
confront the ISIS threat. 
The Philippines has seen its fair share of contemporary security challenges in 
the form of the Abu Sayyaf Group and the New People’s Army – the armed wing 
of the Communist Party of the Philippines. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, 
then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo labelled the Abu Sayyaf Group as an 
international terrorist movement and accepted from the US a significant military 
aid package and direct military assistance to counter Abu Sayyaf Group fighters 
on Basilan Island.64 Its focus on internal armed conflicts under the guise of a 
counter-terrorism agenda is also clearly reflected in the broad definition of 
terrorism adopted in the Human Security Act of 2007 (Philippines), which 
encompasses ‘sowing and creating a condition of widespread and extraordinary 
fear and panic among the populace, in order to coerce the government to give in 
to an unlawful demand’.65 Similarly, Thailand’s counter-terrorism approach was 
                                                 
61  Roach, above n 60, 27. 
62  See Mathilde Tarif, ‘Malaysia Keeps Ruling under Controversial Security Laws in Secret’ (Florence 
Carré trans), Le Journal International (online), 4 August 2013 <http://www.lejournalinternational.fr/ 
Malaysia-keeps-ruling-under-controversial-security-laws-in-secret_a1131.html>. 
63  Quoted in Abhrajit Gangopadhyay and Celine Fernandez, ‘Malaysian Police Re-arrest High-Profile 
Terror Suspect’, The Wall Street Journal (online), 28 May 2013 <http://blogs.wsj.com/indonesiarealtime/ 
2013/05/28/malaysian-police-re-arrest-high-profile-terror-suspect/>. 
64  For details, see, eg, Larry Niksch, ‘Abu Sayyaf: Target of Philippine–US Anti-Terrorism Cooperation’ 
(Congress Research Service, United States Congress, 24 January 2007) <https://www.fas.org/sgp/ 
crs/terror/RL31265.pdf>. 
65  Human Security Act of 2007 (Philippines) s 3. Compare with the definition of terrorism adopted for the 
purpose of Terrorism Financing Prevention and Suppression Act of 2012 (Philippines) s 3(j)(2): 
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aimed at suppressing separatist movements in the southern Malay-Muslim 
provinces. This has become more institutionalised with the enactment of the 
Internal Security Act 2008 (Thailand).66  
Unlike the founding members of ASEAN, the development of anti-terror 
security apparatuses and legal instruments has not been such a vital priority for 
newer member states. For Cambodia, while the policy emphasis has been on 
transnational crime, it has looked to Australia and the US for help to develop  
its counter-terrorism capability.67 In 2003, Cambodia established the National 
Counter-Terrorism Committee, a policy level decision-making body chaired by 
the Prime Minister that directly addresses the government’s domestic and 
international counter-terrorism responsibilities. This decision was made in light 
of grave concerns that JI leader Hambali had reportedly travelled freely through 
Cambodia.68 After ratifying or acceding to all major counter-terrorism treaties, 
Cambodia enacted the Law on Counter Terrorism 2007 (Cambodia) and the Law 
on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism 2007 
(Cambodia) to provide mechanisms for domestic counter-terrorism measures and 
international legal co-operation in counter-terrorism. However, as noted in its 
2006 Defence Policy, the real challenges in enhancing its counter-terrorism 
capabilities for Cambodia have been the lack of communication infrastructure, 
equipment, specialised skills, training and resources.69  
Many Southeast Asian states attempted to address terrorism financing as part 
of their anti-money laundering policy, which was consistent with ASEAN’s 
approach to regional co-operation against transnational crime. Malaysia enacted 
the Anti-Money Laundering, Anti-Terrorism Financing and Proceeds of 
Unlawful Activities Act 2001 (Malaysia), and Myanmar introduced the Control  
of Money Laundering Law 2002 (Myanmar), 70  with a view to implementing 
obligations under the relevant UN Security Council resolutions. While 
maintaining the official position that the existing criminal law provides a 
comprehensive and effective legal framework to combat terrorism,71 Vietnam 
                                                                                                                         
 For a critical analysis, see H Harry L Roque Jr, ‘The Human Security Act and the IHL Law of the 
Philippines: Of Security and Insecurity’ in Victor V Ramraj et al (eds), Global Anti-Terrorism Law and 
Policy (Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed, 2012) 310, 316–25. 
66  For details, see Peter Chalk et al, The Evolving Terrorist Threat to Southeast Asia: A Net Assessment 
(RAND Corporation, 2009) ch 6. 
67  Vannarith Chheang, ‘Cambodian Security and Defence Policy’ in Security Outlook of the Asia Pacific 
Countries and Its Implications for the Defense Sector (National Institute of Defense Studies, 2013) 3, 9–
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Resolution 1373 (2001) Concerning Counter-Terrorism Addressed to the President of the Security 
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also responded by issuing the Decree on Prevention and Combat of Money-
Laundering 2005 (Vietnam). On the other hand, the anti-money laundering 
legislation in Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand was deemed inadequate by 
the Financial Action Task Force – a Paris-based global standard-setting body for 
anti-money laundering and the combating of the financing of terrorism – and was 
replaced by a new, specific counter-terrorist financing law in 2012–13 to avoid 
possible financial sanctions.72  
Both Brunei and Singapore enacted legislation to combat financing of 
terrorism upon their accession to or ratification of the Terrorist Financing 
Convention in 2002. 73  However, no further counter-terrorism measure was 
adopted until they ratified the ACCT in 2011 and 2007 respectively. Singapore 
acceded to the 1997 Terrorist Bombing Convention only in 2007 and in the same 
year enacted the Terrorism (Suppression of Bombings) Act 2007 (Singapore, cap 
324A, 2008 rev ed) in order to give effect to the 1997 Convention.74 Brunei 
enacted its comprehensive counter-terrorism legislation on 1 August 2011 soon 
after its ratification of the ACCT on 28 April 2011, even though it acceded to the 
1997 Convention much earlier in 2002. In a similar vein, Vietnam commenced 
the process of developing programs to implement the provisions of the ACCT 
upon ratification in 2010, including the enactment of counter-terrorism specific 
legislation.75 
Although it has not had to deal with terrorism in any significant way, Lao 
People’s Democratic Republic established a National Ad Hoc Committee for 
implementing Security Council Resolution 1373, and amended its penal law in 
2005 to criminalise various acts of terrorism.76 Recently, the Law on Anti-Money 
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Press, 2nd ed, 2012) 271, 284–5. 
75  See Pham Vinh Quang, ‘Statement by Mr Pham Vinh Quang Deputy Permanent Representative of the 
Socialist Republic of Viet Nam at the United Nations Secretary-General’s Symposium on International 
Counter-Terrorism Cooperation’ (Speech delivered at United Nations Secretary-General’s Symposium on 
International Counter-Terrorism Cooperation, New York, 19 September 2011) <http://www.un.org/en/ 
terrorism/ctitf/pdfs/vietnam.pdf>. 
76  See Letter Dated 12 March 2007 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee Established 
Pursuant to Resolution 1373 (2001) Concerning Counter-Terrorism Addressed to the President of the 
Security Council, UN Doc S/2007/141 (13 March 2007) annex, enclosure (‘Report of the Government of 
 
2016 Thematic: Counter-Terrorism Law and Policy in Southeast Asia 1233
Laundering and Counter-Financing of Terrorism 2015 was promulgated, 
defining terrorism broadly to include acts that ‘affect lives, health, freedom, or 
[pose] physical and psychological intimidation’.77 Likewise, Myanmar has been 
working with the International Monetary Fund and the UN Office on Drugs and 
Crime in drafting its counter-terrorism and anti-money laundering laws pursuant 
to Security Council Resolution 1373 and Resolution 1624, 78  while seeking 
assistance from the US and international organisations for the capacity building 
of its Financial Intelligence Unit that oversees terrorist financing issues.79 
 
IV   ASSESSING ASEAN’S ROLE IN COUNTER-TERRORISM 
LAW AND POLICY 
Assessing ASEAN’s efforts in regional counter-terrorism co-operation for the 
development and implementation of the supporting national laws and policies can 
be a rather perplexing exercise. On the one hand, the historical record suggests 
that ASEAN member states have collaborated among themselves successfully in 
so many instances on the issue of counter-terrorism both before and after the 
horrific events of 9/11 and more specifically to Southeast Asia, the bomb attacks 
perpetrated by JI in Bali on 12 October 2002.80 On the other hand, as examined 
above, Southeast Asian governments have not handled terrorism in the same 
way. Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, and Singapore, for example, adopted a 
comprehensive legislative approach to tackling the challenge, whereas Malaysia 
and Thailand have relied more on coercive, militaristic responses. What does this 
gap between their commitment at the regional level and action at the national 
level mean for ASEAN’s role and competence in dealing with regional security 
issues such as counter-terrorism? In order to answer this question, ASEAN’s 
counter-terrorism efforts must be understood in the wider context of ASEAN 
community development. 
 
A   ASEAN’s Institutional Competence versus State Sovereignty 
ASEAN was initially built as an informal diplomatic arrangement. The legal 
principles that guide the operation of ASEAN were enshrined in the 1976 Treaty 
of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia (‘TAC’), with clear emphasis on the 
principles of respect for state sovereignty and non-interference. As Acharya has 
observed, the security arrangement that has been put in place under the TAC is as 
much for the stability of the entire region from external interference as is for  
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the protection of the national polity of each member state.81  ASEAN’s legal 
framework has been recently buttressed with the adoption of the 2007 ASEAN 
Charter. While upholding the traditional principles of respect for state 
sovereignty and non-interference,82 the ASEAN Charter also sets out the principle 
of ‘shared commitment and collective responsibility in enhancing regional peace, 
security and prosperity’.83 The adoption of the ACCT earlier in the same year can 
be seen as a step towards such shared commitment in the specific context of 
counter-terrorism.  
However, the ASEAN Charter elicited a flurry of reactions over the wisdom 
of its design and contents and its relevance to conflict resolution in Southeast 
Asia. Some commentators have compared it with supranational regional bodies 
such as the EU and criticised the ASEAN Charter for its evident lack of 
enforcement mechanisms.84 Those critics, including former officials of ASEAN 
member states who helped build and promote ASEAN, took the Association to 
task for lacking the courage to adopt recommendations – or diluting those it did 
adopt – proposed by its Eminent Persons Group aimed at further 
institutionalising ASEAN.85 Calling the ASEAN Charter ‘a disappointment’, an 
eminent pundit criticised the ASEAN Charter’s codification of existing ASEAN 
norms that preserve the Association’s inter-governmental character, arguing that 
‘ASEAN had even gone backwards’ with such a conservative document.86 
It is wrong to assume that ASEAN should or is designed to achieve regional 
integration modelled upon the EU in order to be an effective regional institution. 
Nevertheless, the facts on the ground persistently underscore the wide gap 
between aspiration and reality. As is the case with most – if not all – forms of 
ASEAN regionalism, the protection of the political regime against the threat of 
subversive movements has often been given primacy at the expense of the 
broader regional interest.87 For example, with the emergence of the ISIS threat, 
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Indonesia’s counter-terrorism efforts have hitherto dovetailed with obligations 
outlined in UN Security Council Resolution 2170 and Resolution 2178.88 Yet, as 
Indonesian concerns over the relative weakness of the country’s counter-
terrorism laws against ISIS noted at the outset suggest,89 there remains room to 
strengthen its legal regime against terrorism. If anything, the challenges 
Indonesian authorities previously faced in apprehending Abu Bakar Bashir, the 
spiritual leader and co-founder of JI now serving a 15 year prison sentence, are a 
reminder of the legal and political complexities Indonesian law enforcement 
authorities have to negotiate.90 On the other hand, John Sidel, a noted scholar of 
Indonesian society and politics, has concluded that recent manifestations of 
extremist violence in Indonesia reflect, not growing support for Islamism but its 
opposite, namely, the post-1998 decline of Islam as a banner for unifying and 
mobilising Muslims in Indonesian politics and society.91 The primacy of regime 
security against the threats of subversive movements is equally evident in the 
case of the Philippines’ overt reliance on the defence co-operation with the US to 
deal with its internal counter-terrorism operations as noted above.92 
These internal political and legal constraints mean that ASEAN has limited 
capacity to harmonise national responses to counter-terrorism in Southeast Asia. 
However, this does not necessarily mean that ASEAN is in any way restrained in 
exercising its institutional competence to facilitate the development and domestic 
implementation of legal responses to terrorism through regional co-operation. 
ASEAN’s institutional competence has arguably been exercised in accordance 
with the Association’s longstanding principles of respect for state sovereignty 
and non-interference, serving merely to complement national and sub-regional 
efforts. The regional counter-terrorism co-operation through ASEAN is designed, 
as discussed above, to be complementary to respective national efforts to counter 
modern transnational terrorist threats by providing opportunities to overcome the 
limits of national efforts. 
 
B   The ‘ASEAN Way’ 
The fundamental tension between the allure of a regional community and the 
reality of state sovereignty also animates the maintenance of the ‘ASEAN Way’ 
within the framework of the ASEAN Charter. Needless to say, ASEAN has its 
fair share of supporters who have hailed the ASEAN Charter’s passage and 
defended its express reliance on the ‘ASEAN Way’. Nevertheless, six years after 
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the ASEAN Charter’s entry into force, ASEAN’s ongoing difficulties in building 
an ASEAN Community underscore the Association’s apparent difficulty to 
reconcile the tension between regional community and state sovereignty. 93 
Indeed, the evident readiness of many ASEAN member states to prioritise respect 
for state sovereignty, often at the expense of their regional community interest, 
implies that, so far as the ASEAN Way is maintained as the preferred modus 
operandi, ASEAN law – in conjunction with its regionalism – is likely to remain 
weak in the foreseeable future.94  
Ambiguous and vague language is ubiquitous in most – if not all – regional 
treaties on counter-terrorism. As Gregory Rose and Diana Nestorovska have 
observed in their comparative assessment of regional counter-terrorism treaties: 
They are typically couched in vague language and contain many uncertain 
obligations. Their various definitions of terrorist acts and approaches to the 
criminalisation of those acts are conceptually flawed or inadequate. Most of their 
measures for prevention and intelligence cooperation are insubstantial. Their main 
strengths are in providing procedures for mutual assistance in investigations and in 
extradition arrangements.95 
Although ASEAN clearly lacks a strong legal regime comparable to the EU, 
its member states have nevertheless relied on informal codes of interstate conduct 
– such as consultation and consensus-building – to guide their relations with one 
another as well as their relations with external powers. In that respect, a realistic 
appraisal and acknowledgement of what ASEAN can and cannot accomplish is 
needed. Indeed, as Rodolfo Severino, the former Secretary-General of ASEAN, 
has observed:  
ASEAN’s supreme achievements have been in the political and security areas. By 
building confidence and dispelling mutual suspicion between members through 
frequent meetings and other cooperative activities, ASEAN has made Southeast 
Asia’s impressive economic growth possible. … Some observers may be 
disappointed by ASEAN’s failure to ‘resolve’ legal sovereignty and jurisdictional 
disputes involving member states, but they forget that ASEAN is not an 
adjudicating body and was never meant to function as such.96 
The same qualifications hold for ASEAN’s approach to counter-terrorism. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that even the centralised approach, adopted by 
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the EU through Europol (the EU’s law enforcement agency) and Frontex (the 
EU’s external borders management agency), has been criticised for a range of 
issues such as a lack of commitment and co-operation from member states97 – 
flaws exposed by, among other things, the ISIS-linked attacks in Brussels and 
Paris and the refugee flows from Syria.98 
Both the ACCT and MLAT constitute examples of the ‘ASEAN minus X’ and 
‘flexible consensus’ principles that ostensibly guide intramural co-operation 
within ASEAN.99 Past practice among ASEAN economic ministers allowed for 
member states to agree on economic liberalisation on the basis of ‘ten minus X’ 
and/or ‘two plus X’ principles.100 This ensured that member states wishing to 
embark on co-operative initiatives at a pace faster than the rest could still 
proceed. It has been argued that the ASEAN minus X formula should only be 
applied as a measure of last resort when it would not be possible for all ASEAN 
member states to ratify an agreement for its entry into force within a reasonable 
period of time. Another possibility would have been to delimit a maximum or 
threshold number of ASEAN member states that would comprise the ‘X’ to 
which ASEAN treaties are to apply.101 In enabling the entry into force of the 
ACCT after six member states have ratified it, ASEAN has clearly elected to 
avoid such alternatives. 
 
V   CONCLUSION 
The history of political struggles and armed violence that continues to 
confront many Southeast Asian nations has been causing ambivalence towards 
rigorous counter-terrorism measures in this region. ASEAN’s counter-terrorism 
initiatives must be understood in this wider political context where national 
counter-terrorism efforts in each country are enmeshed with their own political 
agenda of national harmony and combating dissidents. ASEAN may well be seen 
as taking a slow and soft approach to counter-terrorism with the adoption of a 
series of ‘soft law’ instruments before the ACCT finally came into force in 2013. 
Nevertheless, as this article has demonstrated, there is sufficient evidence to 
suggest that ASEAN’s gradual development of a regional counter-terrorism 
framework has assisted its member states, particularly those with less experience 
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in dealing with the issue, in building their legal and operational capacity to 
engage in international co-operation for counter-terrorism. 
There is no denying that the political and legal constraints within each 
member state necessarily limit ASEAN’s capacity to facilitate regional co-
operation in Southeast Asia. However, those constraints should not be understood 
as obstacles to what ASEAN aims to achieve, but rather as socio-political 
structures in which ASEAN can engage in mutual social persuasion and forge 
deeper intra-regional co-operation in a manner that complements respective 
national efforts to develop their own legal and policy responses to terrorist 
threats, in tandem with evolving international co-operation on counter-terrorism. 
The regional counter-terrorism initiatives through ASEAN are thus seen as a 
process of ‘norm internalisation’, rather than imposition of legal obligation, in an 
attempt to overcome the limits of national efforts against transnational threats 
posed by modern terrorist activities, which are based on the traditional strategies 
and structures that remain as the legacies of their fight against communist 
insurgency and dissidence. 
 
 
